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Abstract 
This study attempts to explore whether colonialism contributed to disparities in the 
quality of state institutions and governance in former colonial territories, using Botswana 
and Nigeria as case studies for two post-colonial states. The study aims to contribute to 
the understanding of the reasons behind disparities between post-colonial states in terms 
of quality of institutions and strength of governments. The points of leverage found in 
this study supports the hypothesis that the quality and strength of contemporary 
institutions in former colonial states is a function of both colonial experiences as well as 
domestic conditions pre- and post-colonialism.  
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Introduction 
While many scholars have asserted that the colonialism might have accelerated the 
development process through the exportation of new thoughts and inventions to those 
countries that were once colonized, others argue that colonialism did more harm than 
good. This paper aims to explore how colonialism affected the formation and competence 
of the contemporary political institutions and governance systems in two post-colonial 
states of Africa: Botswana and Nigeria. Despite the similarities between both countries, 
the British colonialism of Nigeria differed considerably from that of Botswana, where 
both countries were exposed to different colonial policies and strategies. Since 
independence, the two countries are nearly polar opposites in terms of political stability, 
corruption and institutional quality (Valentin 2011, Knuckles 2006). According to 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Botswana is classified as the 
least corrupt country on the African continent. On the contrary, Nigeria is rated the 
second most corrupt country in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Mehlum et al (2006) suggested that the key factor that determines a country’s economic 
growth is not its resource abundance but rather the effectiveness of its institutions. 
Similarly, Osabuohien, Efobi and Salami (2012) argue that economic performance and 
development are connected to the efficiency of policies and quality of institutions. 
However, Sawyer (2004) emphasized that governance failure in Africa has its roots in the 
legacy of colonialism. Despite being the target of the liberation movement, colonial 
governance institutions turned out to be the colonialism’s heritage after independence. 
Likewise, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) associated institutions and strategies 
during the colonial period with disparities in economic development after independence. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) and Valentin (2011) describe colonialism as a 
“natural experiment” in which imported institutions have been forced on existing orders 
of informal institutions and local populations. Thus, colonial institutions are believed to 
be a significant determinant of levels of economic performance, political stability, and 
provision of public goods after independence (Lee and Schultz 2012). Moreover, many 
studies have highlighted the connection between different levels of institutional transfer 
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during the course of colonialism and the disparities in institutional quality post-colonial 
states (Gennaioli and Rainer 2005, Lange 2004, Englebert 2000).  
Much economic research attributes Botswana’s impressive economic growth to its strong 
institutions, good governance and transparency (Kaufmann et al. 2009, Valentin 2011, 
Bamiduro 2012). On the other hand, Osabuohien, Efobi and Salami (2012) noted that the 
key reason behind the weak economic performance in Nigeria is its weak institutions. 
Nigeria is notorious for its long history of corrupt and military autocratic regimes, 
leaderships unaccountable to its citizens, and the provision of poor public goods and 
services (Bamiduro 2012). Interestingly, Transparency International consistently lists 
Nigeria as one of highly corrupt states (Transparency International 2013). 
My methodology will be based on a comparative case study between Botswana and 
Nigeria, two former British colonies. I selected these two countries for their geographic, 
historical and extractive resource wealth similarities to make the comparison more 
salient. In other words, Nigeria and Botswana are both sub-Saharan countries that have 
many things in common: same colonizer – Britain, similar colonial period, non-settler 
colonies, and the abundance of the extractive wealth. The timeframe of colonialism and 
independence of both countries is very similar - both became British colonies in the 
1880’s and independent during the 1960’s. Likewise, Nigeria is highly dependent on oil 
while Botswana is highly dependent on diamonds. Additionally, the two countries 
discovered their extractive wealth resources during the first decade after their 
independence (Valentin 2011). 
On the other hand, the populations of the two countries are very different; with Nigeria 
being the most dense and diverse in all of Africa, around 177 million people. The 
population of Botswana is not only much smaller, 2.1 million people (CIA World 
Factbook Botswana 2014), but there is much more land per capita and the traditional 
cattle culture offers a more diverse economy. Most importantly, the two countries are 
nearly polar opposites in terms of political stability, corruption and institutional quality 
(Valentin 2011, Knuckles 2006). According to Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, Botswana is classified as the least corrupt country on the African 
continent. On the contrary, Nigeria is rated the second most corrupt country in the region 
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of Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite these differences, the commonalities between the two 
countries will make the comparison of their post-colonial performances more relevant 
and highlight whether colonialism contributed to the disparities in state governance both 
countries continue to show. In addition, limiting the study to a single colonial power, 
Britain, excludes any possible confounding factors related to the nature of the colonizers’ 
identity and ruling strategies.  
Hence, the paper tries to explore whether colonialism contributed to the success or the 
failure of any of these states. If yes, what was the colonial impact? If not, what are the 
factors? Studying the effects of colonialism on governance might provide more 
information on how a country’s history determines the competency of its governance 
system and the level of corruption. As Ménard and Shirley (2008, p. 633) suggest, this 
type of research should help researchers identify the ways in which colonial rule shaped 
current institutions of former colonies. Through comparing the two countries, the paper 
investigates whether colonialism has contributed to promoting or undermining the 
incentives for ‘good governance’.  
Hypothesis and Research methodology 
The hypothesis to be tested in this study is that colonialism largely accounts for current 
disparities in institutional quality and state governance in two former British colonies. 
The hypothesis maintains that the institutions established during colonization largely 
explain institutional quality today.  
Theory and Types of Colonialism  
Colonialism is typically described as a form of dominance in which a group of people is 
subjugated by another (Horvath, 1972). Linin also viewed the colonial economic system 
as a form of exploitation (Ibid.). Moreover, the term “colonialism” is often used to depict 
“the occupation of Africa, Latin America, Oceania, North America and other territories 
that were controlled by a large population of European settlers” (Stanford, 2012). The 
objective of colonialism was unanimous: exploit economic resources for the colonizing 
country. European powers established administrations with the aim of benefiting the 
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colonizer through economic exploitation and improving the colonizing country’s 
international stature (Fenwick, 2009). 
Forms of Colonialism  
Scholars generally describe several forms of European colonialism: 
1. Company Rule  
In this form of colonialism, European Rulers permitted the founding of private firms that 
were granted sizable lands to manage in the target country. Examples of these companies 
include: the French trading Company and the East India Trading Company (VOC). Such 
firms established their own rules of taxation and labour mobilization and took 
responsibility for all of the expenses related to governing the colonies. By 1924, this form 
of rule was replaced by other forms of European colonialism. 
2. Direct Rule 
Direct rule was the most common form of political administration in the colonial 
territories (Fenwick, 2009). Several European colonizers employed this form of 
colonialism to govern their colonies in Africa including, Belgium, France, Germany, and 
Portugal. They stressed policies of assimilation. The French believed this would lead to 
“civilizing” the colonized populations (Lewis, 1962). These colonialists did not negotiate 
the structures of administration with local rulers. Moreover, the native authorities were 
placed as subordinates in these administrations (Doyle, 1986). Direct rule had a 
centralized legal-administrative structure with a formal chain of command that linked the 
various state actors throughout the colony to the central colonial administration and 
thereby back to the colonizer in Europe (Lange 2004). The European colonizers 
considered native institutions inadequate for their drives and therefore created their own 
structures. The colonial law was enforced by the European military (Fenwick, 2009). 
Additionally, direct rule deployed the approach of "divide and rule" by designing policies 
that purposefully weakened indigenous institutions. 
3. Indirect Rule 
This mode of rule employed native rulers and administrators within the colonial 
government; however, usually natives occupied inferior positions. This form of 
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colonialism was practiced by Britain in governing many of its colonies. Indirect rule was 
first implemented by Lord Lugard in Nigeria; he employed both indigenous institutions 
(Fisher, 1991) and tribal chiefs to execute British orders (Fenwick, 2009). Despite the 
fact that indirect rule was more cooperative than direct rule, it deepened the ethnic 
divisions and empowered specific elites to govern locally on behalf of the British. 
Indirect rule relied on a three-party chain of “patron–client relations” connecting the 
colonial government to the population through tribal chiefs (Lange 2004). Tribal chiefs 
acted as intermediaries between the colonial administration and the local population. 
Lange, Mahoney and Hau (2006) argue that higher levels of development in pre-colonial 
societies encouraged low levels of British colonialism. Normally, only a few hundred 
British supervisors were in charge of administering indirect rule in each colony (Ibid.). 
4. Settler Rule  
This model of colonialism was utilized in southern Africa, where European colonizers 
applied direct rule on their colonies. However, the key character of this model was the 
substantial number of European immigrants who settled in these colonial territories. In 
order to flourish, settlers demanded differential treatment, in terms of protection, as well 
as political and economic rights. Thus, settler rule was known for its cruel policies 
against native people. Settlers from Holland, Britain, Germany and Portugal colonized 
Southern Africa: Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe; 
France colonized Algeria in North Africa; and Britain colonized Australia, New Zealand 
and North America.  
Disparities among Colonizers 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) provided evidence that colonialism 
shaped state institutions. They claimed that differences in colonial experience could be 
responsible for differences in post-colonial institutions, where frameworks and 
institutions of colonial state endured and created the foundation for contemporary 
institutions after independence. 
Much research focuses on the contrasts between the identity of European colonialism and 
the postcolonial outcomes (Lange, Mahoney & Hau 2006). For instance, due to its 
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adoption of better levels of freedom and market economy, some studies argue that British 
colonial rule gave rise to better outcomes, such as strong institutions and less corrupt 
governments, than those of the Spanish or the French (La Porta et al. 1999 & North 
2005). North (2005) claims that Britain left behind institutions that are conducive to 
economic growth. Others found that legal origin is associated with “quality of 
government” in terms of corruption and provision of public goods (La Porta et al. 1999). 
Similarly, Treisman (2000) found that lower levels of corruption are more prevalent in 
the common law countries and attributed that to the British culture and enforcement 
mechanisms. In addition, others found that indirect rule (Whittlesey 1962) and higher 
levels of political participation (Lipset, 1993) led to democracy in the former British 
colonies. Finally, Miles (1994) described the British rule as more respectful of the 
indigenous political institutions than the French. 
On the other hand, other scholars questioned the correlation between the colonial origin 
and post-independence outcomes (Lee & Schultz 2011). Acemoglu et al. 2001, p. 1373) 
suggest that what matters are the domestic conditions in the colonies not just the “identity 
of the colonizer”. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2007) found that colonial origin did not 
have a substantial impact on democracy in former colonial states. Likewise, Lee and 
Schultz (2011) found little evidence that British colonial rule produces better outcomes. 
Finally, Lange, Mahoney & Hau (2006) claim that both conditions in pre-colonial states 
and the identity of the colonizer are two determinants of how colonialism shaped post-
independence institutions (Ibid.). 
British colonialism 
Lange, Mahoney and Hau (2006) divided British colonialism into four types that reflect 
different levels of colonialism. First, settler colonialism; where permanent British 
residents transferred different sorts of institutions from Britain to the colonies without 
maintaining the pre-colonial structures. Examples of settler British colonies include: 
Southern Africa: South Africa, Southern & Northern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe & Zambia), 
Angola, Mozambique, & South West Africa (Namibia).  
 10 
Second, indirect colonialism; where domestic leaders were granted political and legal 
authority over their subjects, but were forced to report to the colonial administration and 
collect taxes on its behalf. By giving chiefs extensive power and authority, British 
indirect colonialism fundamentally changed the political and social structures of the 
colonies (Mamdani 1996). Therefore, it is argued that traditional institutions employed by 
the British were to different degrees colonial structures (Ibid.). This form of colonialism 
was characterized by the low levels of institutional transfer from Britain. This was the 
common method of British rule in Africa. Examples of indirect ruled colonies include 
Botswana and Nigeria. Third, direct colonialism, where the British established a colonial 
state that was bureaucratically organized. However, direct colonialism was not 
characterized by a large and permanent British settlement due to the prevailing disease 
environment. India represents one of the directly British ruled colonies. Finally, the 
hybrid colonialism, which merged indirect rule with either settler or direct rule. Colonial 
South Africa represented, to some extent, this model, where indirect colonialism 
accompanied settlement. 
Approach  
To identify whether colonial legacy contributed to the disparities among the 
contemporary state institutions in former British colonies, we focus here on two very 
different African states, Botswana and Nigeria. The same colonial power - Britain - 
colonized the two countries; however; they both retain extremely different governance 
outcomes. We first start with a brief overview of the current differing qualities of 
governance systems and institutions in Botswana and Nigeria. A comparison of these two 
countries should allow a deep analysis of the real colonizer impact. We then attempt to 
explain why the two countries function differently through tracing the institutional origin 
of each country to the colonial and pre-colonial eras, with a focus on forms and qualities 
of institutions. The study of each country includes a) pre-colonial institutions: reviews the 
preexisting conditions in terms of institutions and governance structure, b) colonial: looks 
at what happened to these institutions under the British rule, and c) post-colonial period 
in terms of the institutional evolution that took place after independence.  
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Comparing Botswana to Nigeria  
In this section we briefly portray the opposite characteristics of Botswana and Nigeria in 
terms of quality of governance systems, corruption, the rule of law, and political stability. 
This comparison should help establish the fact that the two countries are polar opposites 
despite being exposed to the same colonial rule.  
Botswana’s institutions are widely considered to be the least corrupt among sub-Saharan 
countries, where the rule of law is highly respected and poverty is least severe in Africa 
(Owolu, 1999). On the other hand, Nigeria’s political and economic institutions are 
notoriously famous for being corrupt (Seidler 2011). On institutional quality, among 212-
world sample, Botswana ranks 53/212 while Nigeria ranks among the weakest countries 
in terms of institutional quality, scoring 187/212 (Kaufman et al. 2009 & Seidler 2011). 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
The World Bank dataset uses six perception-based indicators to measure institutional 
quality in terms of: voice and accountability, Political stability, Government 
effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and Control of corruption. Each indicator 
ranges from -2.50 (least efficient institutional quality) to +2.50 (most efficient). Table (1) 
shows that Nigeria is lagging behind Botswana on the six measurements of institutional 
quality. Figures (1) and (2) illustrates the huge gap in governance quality between 
Botswana and Nigeria. 
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Table (1): Worldwide Governance Indicators  
Indicator   
Min. Governance  
(-2.5 to +2.5) 
Min. Percentile 
Rank 
Country Year Botswana Nigeria Botswana Nigeria 
Voice and 
Accountability 
2003 0.69 -0.64 68.27 28.37 
2008 0.48 -0.76 61.54 27.4 
2013 0.47 -0.74 62.56 27.49 
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
2003 1.08 -1.65 86.06 5.77 
2008 0.98 -1.86 81.34 5.26 
2013 1.06 -2.08 84.83 3.79 
Government 
Effectiveness 
2003 0.73 -0.96 74.63 15.61 
2008 0.56 -0.97 70.39 15.53 
2013 0.28 -1.01 62.2 16.27 
Regulatory Quality 
2003 0.79 -1.24 75 10.29 
2008 0.48 -0.78 64.56 22.33 
2013 0.66 -0.71 73.21 25.36 
Rule of Law 
2003 0.67 -1.52 71.29 5.74 
2008 0.66 -1.06 70.19 14.42 
2013 0.59 -1.16 68.25 12.32 
Control of 
Corruption 
2003 1.25 -1.32 85.85 4.39 
2008 0.99 -0.81 80.1 21.36 
2013 0.92 -1.2 79.43 9.09 
Source: Kaufman et al. 2009 
Corruption Perceptions Index  
This index, created by Transparency International, ranks countries based on how corrupt 
a country’s public sector is perceived to be. Scores range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 
(very clean). In 2014, Botswana scored 63/100, while Nigeria scored 27/100, which 
indicates that Nigeria is perceived to have a serious corruption problem (Transparency 
International 2014). 
The Human Development Index (HDI) 
The HDI is a standard measure, issued by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), which evaluates long-term progress in three key dimensions of human 
development: health, education and quality of life. According to the HDI, Nigeria’s falls 
under the low human development category, where the country scores 152 out of 187 
countries. On the other hand, Botswana is listed as a medium human development 
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country, scoring 109 out of 187 countries (Human Development Index 2014). This brief 
comparison asserts how Nigeria is lagging behind Botswana in terms of the provision of 
public goods and services.  
Summary 
The comparison of the two countries reveals the extreme disparities between the qualities 
of institutions in two former British colonies. This should defy the hypothesis that states 
that British colonial rule produces better institutional outcomes. However, this still does 
not eliminate the hypothesis that colonialism, by and large, accounts for the disparities 
and underlying differences in post-colonial state institutions. To test this hypothesis, we 
need to know what kind of colonial policies and strategies did Britain employ in both 
countries. 
Botswana 
Botswana’s is a landlocked southern African country with a population of around 2,1 
million people (CIA World Factbook Botswana 2014). It borders to the south and east 
South Africa, to the north Zambia, to the northeast Zimbabwe, and to the west and 
northwest Namibia. Botswana land is mainly arid with only 4% arable lands. The country 
is considered to be very ethnically and religiously homogenous. The predominant 
ethnicity is Tswana, which accounts for 79% of the population. This group is generally 
cattle traders, which migrated from the southeast into the lands of today Botswana in the 
eighteenth
 
century (Acemoglu et al. 2001). Moreover, an estimated 70 percent of the 
population is Christians and nearly 20 percent are not religious.  
Pre-colonial Botswana 
As described by Seidler (2011), by the 19th century, various related Tswana tribes had 
established themselves in the area that currently encompasses Botswana. Tswana tribes 
built strong relationships with one another. They established shared cultural 
establishments and a common dialect, known as Setswana. On the other side, non-
Tswana tribes were organizationally included and generally engaged into Tswana 
community. The tribes took up trade as a source of living and a way to obtain necessary 
merchandise including firearms. By the beginning of the 19th century, contact and trade 
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with Europeans were established. Selling of Ivory and ostrich feathers to the Europeans 
dates back to 1805. 
Political system 
According to Samatar (1997), pre-colonial Botswana was partitioned into a few self-
ruling communities that shared comparable social customs. Every gathering was ruled by 
a chief, (or so called Kgosi), who controlled its political matters. He was the richest 
person in the group and possessed the supreme legal, judicial and official authority. The 
oldest son of the first wife generally succeeded the chief father. In spite of the fact that 
the conventional Botswana chief held a great deal of power, he was not the absolute ruler. 
The chief had full authority over where one resided in the village. His political authority 
was cemented by his control over large herds of cattle and his ability to loan his cattle to 
the tribesmen and members of his group. Those who kept the cattle of the chief lived off 
its production, but when they lost the favor of the chief they could be deprived of access 
to the cattle. This patron-client relationship ensured the loyalty of the subjects.  
Different from most African ethnic groups, the political relationships between the 
Tswana chiefs and their subjects could be described as stable and collaborative (Schapera 
1955). Most importantly, Tswana institutions successfully limited the chief’s authorities 
(Seidler 2011).
 
Three important institutions curbed the chief’s rule. First, the chief had to 
consult a traditional assembly (known as kgotla), which he headed. Before issuing any 
final decision on an issue, the chief had to seek consensus of the assembly. Second, in 
order to maintain political support of his group, the chief had to pursue economic 
interests of the whole group. Third, if the chief was seen as unfit, Tswana customary 
systems permitted the chief’s authority to be openly contested (Samatar, 1997).  
Legislative and Judiciary System 
Chiefs were responsible for establishing justice and settling disputes within the tribal 
frameworks. Lower tribesmen had similar but limited authorities. The trials used to be 
held in the so-called kgotla (Schapera 1955). Legal norms stemmed from traditional 
religions. Existing legal norms were further developed by a chief’s legislation and 
jurisdiction through oral case law (Ibid.). According to Tswana norms, all people were 
equal before the law; no one was above the law, including chiefs. However, at execution 
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of the law, offences by the chiefs and their favorite subjects were treated more mildly 
than those of the commoners (Ibid.). The kgotla provided a platform for the laymen to 
voice their views and complaints. Moreover, the tradition of consultation and consensus 
seeking was principal to Tswana rule and decision-making (Lewis 2006). Early Tswana 
rule is described by political scientists as “personal rule” or “patrimonialism”, in which 
political support depends on patronage and clientelism (Seidler 2011). 
Property Rights 
Seidler (2011) describes that pre-colonial Tswana had established institutional rules for 
property rights, which included ratification of both public as well as private ownerships. 
Chiefs were responsible for enforcing both kinds of ownerships, public and private. The 
chief could also use this privilege to allocate lands to his headsmen in exchange for 
services and political allegiance. The pre-colonial Tswana used private property rights for 
cattle, sheep and plantations alike. 
The Colonial Interlude  
Between 1885 and 1966, today’s Botswana was known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 
a quasi-colony of Britain (Knuckles, 2006). Until independence in 1966, the Protectorate 
was run by the British using a very “light” form of indirect rule (Robinson 2009, p. 1). 
Consequently, the British rule left the pre-colonial tribal frameworks almost unchanged. 
The British neglect of the colony was obvious, where investments in the country’s 
infrastructure and human development were very insignificant. The legacy of British 
colonialism in Botswana was a mere handful of university graduates, no meaningful 
educational infrastructure, some miles of a paved road, and no vital private or public 
sector (Samatar, 1997). According to (Acemoglu et al. 2001, p. 1) the British left 
Botswana with only “12 kilometers of paved road, 22 Batswana university graduates (in 
South Africa) and 100 from secondary school”. However, AJR (2003) claims that after 
independence, Botswana inherited the “good institutions” of private property and the rule 
of law from Great Britain. Moreover, Beaulier (2003) mentioned that there were a few 
harsh British policies imposed on Botswana. The most severe policy was the “hut tax”, 
which was introduced in 1899. The tax required all Botswana hut owners to pay a one-
pound tax to the British government. 
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Fortunately, the British did not exhibit any interest in the economic resources of the 
colony (Scott 2003). The colonial government was very small and had minimum 
collaboration with the colonial local people (Lange 2009, p. 9). Thus, the existence of 
British officials in the colony remained marginal. Lange (2009) mentions that in 1915, 
the estimated number of British government officers was 277, 90% of them border 
guards. In the mid-1930s, only 22 non-police administrators were permanently stationed 
within the Protectorate. 
Political Institutions during Colonial Era  
Tswana political organizations, for example the Kgotla, the need for consultation, 
consensus seeking and the strong relationship between economic wealth and political 
control stayed unchanged under the colonial rule. By and large, the rule of customary 
chiefs was not replaced. However, Good (1999) noted that chiefs’ authority was affected 
by colonization in two ways: (1) Christianity replaced their spiritual functions; (2) They 
were able to benefit financially from acting as agents and tax collectors on behalf of the 
colonizer. Schapera (1936) added that chiefs also obtained payments from merchants as 
well as cash tribute from migrant labor on their way back to their tribes. 
In addition, missionaries extended their proselytization activities during the British 
colonialism. As a result, the spread of Christianity gradually dissolved the chiefs’ 
spiritual status and threatened their religious legitimacy. However, the chiefs responded 
by reacting pragmatically, embracing Christianity and collaborating with the missionaries 
(Seidler 2011). 
Colonial Effects on Tswana Institutions  
Seidler (2011) argues that British rule of the colonial Botswana was indirect, although in 
a much “lighter” version than the “classic indirect rule” which was practiced in Nigeria. 
Tswana figured out how to protect the vast majority of their institutions under the 
colonial rule (Beaulier 2003). Contrary to other African territories, colonialism did not 
dramatically alter the indigenous Tswana institutions. Thus, because of the light colonial 
rule and pragmatic Tswana leaders, the clash between Tswana customary institutions and 
the British ones was avoided (Englebert 2000).  
 17 
However, Samatar (1997) indicated that the British colonial rule impacted the pre-
colonial system in Botswana in three ways. First, by defining 'Tribal Reserves' for each 
Botswana nation, the colonizer solidified what were formerly fluid social and locative 
processes. Second, by recognizing the 'chiefs' as the legitimate traditional rulers of the 
tribes, and proclaiming that they could only be removed by the colonial administration, 
the British ended informal systems of control on chiefs. Third, the colonial state also 
reserved the right to recognize new chiefs. This meant that the tribe (i.e., the chief) and 
the colonial administrator became the two administrative anchors of the new order. 
Post-colonial Botswana 
Political Stability 
In 1966, the modern state of Botswana was born after gaining its independence 
peacefully from the United Kingdom. Shortly afterwards, a constitution was written and a 
form of government was selected. The same constitution and government system have 
been in place ever since (Knuckles, 2006). Botswana today is a parliamentary democratic 
republic with its legislative, judiciary and governmental institutions modeled on 
European examples but customized to Tswana tradition (Seidler 2011). The president 
enjoys robust presidential powers and is chosen by election for no more than two five-
year terms. The right to vote is universal for all adult Botswana citizens. Botswana’s 
democracy has been demonstrated through peaceful transfer of power and impartial 
elections.  
Optimizing Chieftainship and Institutional Building 
The development process of Botswana’s political institutions commenced right after the 
end of the colonial era with the degradation of chiefs’ powers (Seidler 2011). It started in 
1966 with the establishment of elected district councils to manage the tribal territories. 
Simultaneously, the Chieftainship Act of 1965 formalized the chiefs’ authorities and 
rights. Moreover, the power to appoint and remove a chief was delegated to the president. 
Following the chiefs’ acceptance of this formalization, their powers were progressively 
degraded in a chain of regulatory amendments. Likewise, the rest of chiefs’ rights such as 
tax gathering were assigned to local administrations and tax agencies. Eventually, the 
chiefs’ role as chairpersons in the district councils was abolished (Ibid.). 
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More importantly, after independence, Botswana started a conscious adoption of formal 
modern state institutions. Seidler describes how Botswana’s leadership decided which 
institutions to ‘build from scratch’ and which already established ones to maintain. New 
institutions were established on European standards and tailored to Tswana culture. 
Furthermore, pre-colonial institutions such as the kgotla were merged into the official 
institutional structure (Ibid.). Seidler argues that kgotla example demonstrates how the 
incorporation of traditional institutions into the formal institutions enhances political 
legitimacy and improves the efficacy of state institutions. Finally, professional 
bureaucrats, who were either Tswana expatriates or civil servants who received their 
education from abroad, executed the public administration (Ibid.). 
Botswana’s impressive economic performance 
At independence in 1966, Botswana was the third poorest nation worldwide (Tregenna 
2003), with a GDP per capita of nearly US$70. Today, Botswana’s development and 
impressive economic performance are very noteworthy in the African continent and the 
whole world. Since independence, Botswana’s economic growth continued to beat other 
African economies and also exceeded other low-income nations and the world average 
(Seidler 2011). From 1966 to 1996 Botswana’s average real growth per capita reached 
8.2%. Such achievement made Botswana the worlds’ fastest growing economy for three 
consecutive decades (Seidler, 2011). Good fiscal policies and conscious leadership have 
often been referred to as the reasons behind this remarkable growth (Knuckles, 2006). 
However, Botswana’s economy is not free from problems: Unemployment and economic 
inequality are relatively high, especially in the rural regions. HIV/AIDS is another major 
challenge. Botswana suffers from the highest infection rates in the world. Conventional 
sexual behavior has contributed to the dissemination of the disease despite the state’s 
early and well-organized campaign (Lewis 2006). Lastly, Botswana’s rural economic 
development is lagging behind the country’s overall economic expansion (Beaulier 2006, 
p. 108). 
Property rights on land  
The property rights in Botswana are protected by a strong legislative system that 
promotes transparency and limits corruption (World Bank 2009).  
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Nigeria 
Nigeria is a sub-Saharan country located in western Africa on the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria 
shares territorial borders with four francophone countries (Benin to the east, Niger to the 
north and Chad and Cameroon to the west). Nigeria is the most populous nation in 
Africa, with a population estimated to be around 177 million people. It is also the most 
ethnically diverse country in the continent with an aggregation of numerous nationalities. 
It is a pluralistic society both in terms of ethnic and religious composition (Uduma, 
2009). Nigeria is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups; the following are the most 
populous and politically powerful: Hausa and Fulani 29% (in the north), Yoruba 21% (in 
the south west), Igbo (or Ibo) 18% (in the south east), Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, 
Tiv 2.5% (Nigeria CIA Factbook 2014). As for religion, 50% of the population is Muslim 
(predominately in the north), 40% are Christian, and the rest are either not religious or 
follow native religious traditions
 
(ibid.). Natural gas, oil, coal, iron ore, tin, limestone, 
lead, and abundant fertile land comprise the bulk of Nigeria’s natural resources 
(Knuckles, 2006).  
Nigeria’s Oil Resources  
Its world’s 13th
 
largest reserves of oil have turned the country into an African economic 
giant. It has the third biggest economy by GDP in Africa behind South Africa and Egypt. 
Yet most scholars agree that despite immense wealth in natural resources, average 
Nigerians are probably not much better off early in the 21st
 
century than they were in the 
1960s (Seidler, 2011). An estimated 57% of Nigerians are under the poverty line 
(Aigbokhan 2008:13). Also, the country is divided between “either extremely rich or 
extremely poor” with a very small middle class (Obeng-Odoom 2013). 
Pre-colonial Nigeria  
From approximately the twelfth century up to the colonial era, today’s Nigeria was a 
collection of several states, empires, and kingdoms with extensive trade networks and 
complex political systems. Up to the beginning of the colonial era, people were living 
under different administrative arrangements and political systems. The main reason for 
the heterogeneity of pre-colonial Nigeria is viewed to be due to the differences in the 
ethnicity and languages (Seidler 2011). For example, pre-colonial political systems of 
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Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani were chiefly centralized while Igbo’s was a headless, 
decentralized system. 
In pre-colonial Nigeria, the Sokoto Islamic Caliphate was composed of several emirates 
in the north, and the dispersed Yoruba Empire connected coastal settlements with 
political groups in the interior through the strong Kingdom of Oyo. Due to the lack of 
resources to administer Nigeria, with its 20 million people, in 1849 the British deployed a 
few hundred officers under the existing power hierarchy of Yorubaland and the Islamic 
north. Though colonies were different, colonial rule via indigenous elites took place 
throughout the British Empire in several parts of Africa and permitted the British to 
administer vast lands with relatively large populations at a very low cost (Ibid.). 
Legal system  
Shari’ah law is another example of a pre-colonial institution which has prevailed and 
literally re-emerged today. Islamic jurisdiction had been centuries old when the British 
conquered Nigeria’s north. Colonial rule rather strengthened it by integrating it into 
colonial administration (Ibid.). Customary law, which is derived from aboriginal 
traditional customs and norms, including the dispute resolution meetings of pre-colonial 
Yorubaland secret communities and the Egbo of Igboland (Ibid.). 
Colonial Nigeria 
British control over what is today Nigeria was a process of five successive stages (Ibid.). 
The settlement of Lagos became a colony in 1861. From 1886 to 1900 the Royal Niger 
Company controlled central Nigeria. After that its territories were incorporated into the 
new Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In 1906 the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria 
merged with the Lagos Protectorate. Finally, the Southern Protectorates merged with 
Northern Nigeria in 1914, although a certain degree of administrative distinction between 
the Southern and Northern Nigeria was maintained
 
(Ibid.). 
Even after 1914, the colonial administration of the newly created “Colony and 
Protectorate of Nigeria” was by no means uniform, and was highly decentralized. This 
reflected the enormous cultural difference of the ethnic groups that had been artificially 
united in one territory (Seidler, 2011). Only the treasury, railways, judiciary, military and 
post and telegraphs were managed centrally by Frederick Lugard who was appointed as 
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the first Governor-General. Most other things and day-to-day business was effectively 
regionalized in the hands of Lugard’s two Lieutenant-Generals (one for the North and 
one for the South). Even working languages differed. The Northern administration used 
widely common Hausa whereas the South used English. 
Lange (2004) argues that British rule in Nigeria was an extreme case of indirect rule. The 
policy of indirect rule famously formulated by Frederick Lugard as High Commissioner 
of Northern Nigeria eventually became a goal for the administration of the whole of 
Nigeria. Indirect rule basically meant that existing political hierarchies were remodeled 
into units of local self-government that fitted into the British colonial administration. 
Existing traditional political leaders (Emirs, Shehus, chiefs etc.) were to govern their 
people, not as independent but as dependent rulers (Seidler, 2011). The British also had a 
say in the nomination of local village leaders (Ibid.).  
Different from the Botswana study, Nigeria was confronted with a variation of colonial 
ruling strategies and tax institutions (Ibid.). Indirect rule in Nigeria was quite different 
from the “light” rule in Botswana. Moreover, Tswana chiefs were financially 
independent. They kept only 10% of the tax revenues. Nigerian suzerains were instead, 
de facto salaried functionaries of the British administration. 
Colonial Impact 
As per Coleman (1963) British rule brought a range of changes. The most significant 
changes for the aim of this study are: First, slavery was abolished in Bornu and the whole 
of Nigeria, but – in order not to upset the social structure – only those who ran away from 
the former masters were deemed free. British control of all of Nigeria created a large free 
trade area. Security along the trading routes was enhanced and transaction costs reduced. 
As a result the volume of internal trade increased. Investments in infrastructure (roads 
and railways) promoted trade. A common currency was introduced, although it took until 
the mid 20th century to replace the traditional money units. In 1922 more than 40 per cent 
of the revenue of the colony was spent on construction and maintenance of infrastructure. 
In 1950 there were more better transport infrastructure, free trade and currency unit. They 
sound economically great, but they mainly served the overall goal of providing resources 
for British manufacturers and markets for British goods (Ibid.). Hence, colonial economic 
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policies aimed to maximize exports and imports. Internal markets seemed to have been 
neglected. International trade was almost monopolized by a few European companies, 
such as the United Africa Company (UAC). Off the main exporting routes, internal 
markets had hardly been developed during colonial rule. The British created a class of 
educated local bureaucrats needed to perform routine tasks of administration. To avoid 
corruption, this group was liable to serve in areas different from those of their birth 
(Ibid.). 
Taxation 
The British colonial administration eventually set out to simplify the existing tax system. 
Its aim was to “... consolidate the multiplicity of taxes into a single `general` tax, payable 
on a single demand after the harvest, and whenever possible in currency instead of in 
kind” (Lugard 1922, p. 236). The other aim was to finance the costs of British 
administration. Usually 50 per cent of the tax revenue was kept by the British. The 
second half reverted to the native treasury. A second feature of indirect rule in Nigeria 
was the regularization of expenditures out of the native treasuries in accordance with a 
budget, which was subject to scrutiny by colonial officers. 
Property rights of land  
Across the whole colony, British rule had dissimilar impacts on traditional land rights. 
Whereas in the north the administration prohibited anyone (European, Nigerian – whether 
from the south or the north) from acquiring a freehold title, in the urban and semi urban 
areas in the South, which had been under British influence much longer, the 
administration developed early forms of individual land tenure (Coleman 1963). 
Customary land laws worked against fast economic integration with the European 
economy. Land rights inhibited internal migration of Nigerians. Ethnic groups from 
overpopulated land (such as those in the Ibo territory in the South) were not allowed to 
settle in other areas in Nigeria (Ibid.). European migration or land purchases by 
Europeans remained minimal. 
Induced Inequality 
The implementation of British indirect rule affected local traditional institutions to a 
varying degree in Nigeria. In the south and in the former capital Lagos, British rule 
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brought more European education, Christianity and Western work ethics. In the Muslim 
north, British indirect rule largely strengthened and rigid existing institutional 
arrangements.  
Colonial regime showed little enthusiasm for promoting the education in Northern 
Nigeria (Seidler, 2011). This can be attributed to the fact that missionaries were not 
welcomed in the Muslim dominated North of Nigeria, where the spread of Christianity 
was closely related with schooling that was mostly run by missionaries (Ibid.). The 1939 
census in Northern Nigeria counted only 25,067 pupils in primary schools out of a 
population of 11.5 million. In the South, 267,788 attended school out of a population of 
8.6 million (Seidler, 2011).  
Post-colonial Nigeria 
Nigeria obtained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1960. At that time, there 
were nearly 60 million people belongs to more than 250 distinct ethnic groups in the 
country (Knuckles, 2006). Shortly after independence, the cohesiveness of the nation was 
weekend by disagreements over lands and authority. Moreover, ethnic tensions and 
disputes fuelled many violent struggles over power, including a long and very bloody 
civil war in the 1970s. This civil war has been judged by many as genocidal against the 
Igbo. During the two and a half years of fighting, between one and three million Igbo, 
who sought to break away, were killed, while far fewer Hausa-Fulani died. Ultimately, 
General Yakubu Gowon who led the fight against the seceding eastern region became the 
leader of Nigeria after the civil war (Ibid.). 
Ever since independence, Nigeria has suffered from political instability. The nature of the 
Nigerian state produced an elite class that that many have seen as only concerned with 
consolidation of power (Afegbua and Adejuwon 2012). Several military coups and 
constitutional amendments have changed Nigeria’s constitution since its independence. 
The military ruled Nigeria almost entirely uninterrupted from 1983 to 1999. During this 
rule, a culture of impunity grew and soon became institutionalized. In addition, military 
rule undermined the rule of law in the country (Seidler 2011). Nigeria finally achieved 
democracy in 1999. The election in 2007, although regarded as severely flawed by 
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international observers, can be considered as the country’s first democratic experience 
(OECD 2008). 
Two damaging coups took place six years after independence. The Igbo population 
triggered the first coup in 1966 due to corrupt political leaders, who were from the 
Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups. The new Igbo leaders, though, did not govern with much 
less corruption or selfishness, and a few months later, a second coup occurred. This coup 
placed a Hausa-Fulani as the head of state, who immediately created a federal 
government, dividing the country into four regions. Afterwards, eastern region (mainly 
Igbo) seceded from the rest of the country and called itself the independent state of 
Biafra. Subsequently, the central government counteracted by forming a military 
government.  
Since independence, Nigeria’s economy has been heavily dependent on exports of natural 
resources ranging from agricultural products to minerals. Oil became the most important 
economic resource in the 1970s. Today, Nigeria is the world’s 13th
 
largest producer of 
crude oil at approximately 2.5 million barrels per day. Oil and related products account 
for around 95% of Nigeria’s exports and more than 70% of the government’s fiscal 
revenues. It contributes around one third of Nigeria’s GDP. Other important export 
commodities are traditionally cacao and rubber.  
The importance of oil is economic as well as political. To eliminate secessionist 
tendencies, the federal government redistributes a substantial share of the oil revenues to 
Nigeria’s 36 states and 776 local governments, which have become highly dependent on 
this source of income (Englebert 2009). Although oil revenues per capita increased 
tenfold from about 33 USD in 1965 to 325 USD in 2000, income per head did not grow 
accordingly. Moreover, scholars argue that oil revenues have promoted overall corruption 
and further undermined Nigeria’s state institutions (Martin and Subramanian 2003). 
Institutional Failure 
Many institutional experts agree that Nigeria’s economic problems are correlated with its 
extremely weak political and economic institutions (Seidler 2011). Nigerian state 
institutions broadly fail to provide a framework for basic political and economic 
institutions on a nation-wide scale. It seems that the only effect it achieves is keeping the 
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country from dissolution (Knuckles 2006). The weakness of Nigeria’s state institutions 
can be best displayed by the marginalization of federal law (Uduma 2013). The 1951 
constitution cemented the idea of federalism with its components as regions. However, 
Uduma (2013) argues that a federal system is useless when its component units (the 
regions) lack autonomy and self-governance.  
According to Uhunmwuangho and Barr (2011), federalism as a system was meant to 
integrate people in a society that is diverse ethnically, geographically, culturally and even 
religiously. Thus, it is an imperative that once a government is in place, it must strive to 
equitably distribute powers, functions and resources among these diverse groups. But in 
Nigeria, there are incidents where governments have openly violated the principles of 
federalism. In theory, Nigeria can be said to be operating the federal system of 
government, whereas in the real world, the country is leaning towards a unitary state. 
Therefore, the problem with federalism in Nigeria is the mix-application or non-
application at all, especially as it has to do with power distribution. Nigeria has not been 
applying the principle of power distribution to the letter and this resulted in the escalation 
of ethnic conflicts and lack of trust among ethnic groups. Thus, ethnic tension in Nigeria 
is the consequent of improper distribution of powers and resources. This is because the 
people who now feel left out in the game see it as a necessity to resort to their ethnic 
groups which will provide them a good support for competing with others for resources 
and against domination by the dominant groups. Also, ethnic politics has become the 
norm, as it is believed that an alliance with one’s ethnic group provides an easy access to 
resources (Ibid.). 
Legal System 
In Nigeria today four different systems of law are applied: the received English common 
law, Nigerian legislation, customary law including Shariah law, and modern case law. 
The result is an institutional mess (ADB 2009). The legal system in Nigeria is based on 
English common law, except in 12 states where Islamic Shariah law governs instead. 
Nigeria’s constitutional foundation was built in colonial times. It foresaw a common 
legislative basis for the north and south. In addition, it divided Nigeria into three regions 
(Northern, Eastern and Western Region) each with a House of Assembly and a House of 
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Chiefs. In 1963, an additional region called the Mid-Western Region was created. This 
structure was unpopular from the start and was politically contested in particular in the 
south. Consequently a new constitution entered into force in 1954, which devolved more 
political power to the regions. Today – after years of military rule and constitutional 
revisions - Nigeria is a federal republic made up of 36 states. Each state has its own law-
making organ known as the House of Assembly. State House of Assemblies have powers 
to legislate on any matter in the concurrent legislative list and any other matter with 
respect to which it is empowered to make laws in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. The system of Government in the Nigeria is modeled after the American 
presidential system with three arms of government, namely, the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary. The president holds extensive powers similar to the presidential 
systems of France or the United States.  
Security 
Institutions which provide only a minimum of personal security to citizens are not simply 
viewed as ineffective, but also as a source of insecurity themselves. Failure to provide 
personal security to citizens has undermined the legitimacy of Nigeria’s federal 
government. This has led to a privatization of security on a local level. Vigilante groups 
(e.g. the Bakassi boys) and ethnic militias (e.g. yan banga) legally co-exist with or are at 
least untroubled by the police force. Criminalization of politics is another problem. 
Numerous assassinations or assassination attempts were recorded during local elections 
in 2004 (Bach 2006, p. 77). Key players in domestic politics appear to be backed by 
ethnic militias or groups of vigilantes such as Arewa Consultative Forum in the north, the 
Afenifere in the southwest or Ohanze Ndigbo in the south (Bach 2006). 
Property rights 
Before 1978, the absence of strong property rights impeded economic use of Nigeria’s 
resources (Seidler 2011). Today, federal law may conflict with informal institutions 
governing land rights. In the Niger Delta property conflicts over land ownership fuel 
violence and the appropriation of crude oil by the region’s inhabitants (Bach 2006). 
Theoretically, the federal law of 1978 nationalized all lands and delegated their 
management to the Local Governments. Despite the fact that this legislation applies to all 
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unoccupied lands that belong to the state, the heads of villages or chiefs have continued 
practicing their traditional rights to allocate land within their village areas. State 
authorities have silently accepted this. This practice of conflicting institutions of property 
rights has led to numerous cases of conflicts and inefficiencies. This has undermined 
Nigeria’s potential to attract foreign investments.  
Political Legitimacy  
Given the weakness or low level of legitimacy enjoyed by the formal federal institutions, 
Nigerian civilian and military rulers alike have resorted to a traditional informal 
institution with arguably high legitimacy all over Nigeria: patron-client relationship. This 
has resulted in a form of neo-patrimonialism, which is very resistant to modernization. 
Resources are allocated according to political interests cause clientelism and corruption 
(Englebert 2000). Effective state institutions have either not been transferred or have 
failed to be embedded in existing institutions in a coherent way.  
Englebert points out that in Africa, the gap between the post-colonial state and informal 
local institutions may have been most severe. It caused a typical chain of events: after the 
first years of independence formal new state institutions began to lack legitimacy in the 
eyes of the population. People preferred to follow local informal institutions. Indirect rule 
and arbitrary state boundaries resulted in weak central state institutions which lacked 
legitimacy compared to local informal ones (which may even have been strengthened by 
indirect rule). 
Ethnic and Sectarian Unrest 
The process of ethnic identification, which is rewarded with shares of oil revenues by the 
federal government, is self-reinforcing and thus very persistent. In this institutional 
framework it is only rational for all actors to create ever more ethnic states and 
governments (Greif and Laitin 2004). Ethnic heterogeneity based on arbitrarily drawn 
boundaries adds to the lack of legitimacy. To maintain their power, civilian and military 
leaders alike have resorted to a neo-patrimonial ruling strategy, which is more in line 
with traditional institutions based on patron-client relations. To cater the needs of over 
250 ethnic groups each with their own institutional development path - seems impossible 
for one single national institutional framework (Ibid.). 
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The competition between those that see themselves as the true “indigenes” of an area 
(here: local Kanuri) and those that are considered to be more recent “settlers” (here: those 
who had to pay) who are members of different ethnic groups. This practice can be found 
all over Nigeria and is an effective institutional arrangement for allocation of land rights, 
but it is economically and politically clearly sub-optimal to an institutional solution based 
on more equal access. Furthermore the distinction between settler and indigenes is very 
often the reason for Nigeria’s many violent riots (BBC 2011). 
In some Northern Muslim states (e.g. Kano) so-called hisba groups, made up of Muslim 
youth seeking to enforce Shari’ah law, have in effect developed local law enforcement 
forces in clear contradiction with federal law and the police. Conflicts with state 
institutions have either been settled in case-by-case solutions or have led to serious 
clashes and unrest (Adamu 2008). The re-introduction of shari’ah law in the 12 Muslim 
states of Nigeria has led to violent religious clashes, mainly between Christians and 
Muslims. 
Englebert adds that in many cases, ethnic heterogeneity based on arbitrarily drawn 
boundaries added to the lack of legitimacy. To stay in power, the leaders appealed to a 
neo-patrimonial ruling strategy, which was more in line with prevailing local institutions. 
Distributing oil revenues to create dependencies is just another form of the patron-client 
relationship which is well known all over Nigeria. Today, the results of neo-patrimonial 
rule are clearly visible. Inefficient institutions foster corruption and cause widespread 
distortion in market mechanisms (Englebert 2000). 
Discussion 
Explanation of Post-colonial Disparities in Nigeria and Botswana 
Despite the similarities between Botswana and Nigeria, the institutional performance in 
both countries is at polar opposites. Botswana is a democratic politically stable country 
with the least levels of corruption in Africa. In contrast, Nigeria suffers from chronic 
levels of political instability, corruption and institutional failure. Comparing the colonial 
legacy of both countries should help us investigate the colonial impact on the 
contemporary governance systems. 
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Nigeria and Botswana’s colonial pasts share some similarities, both being characterized 
by late British colonialism, indirect rule and negligible European immigration. However, 
as Fenwick (2009) argues that the nature of African states since independence has been 
greatly affected by their colonial experiences. The two countries were exposed to 
different colonial policies and strategies. British colonialism of Nigeria differed 
considerably from that of Botswana. Despite its name, indirect rule in Nigeria meant 
involvement of British officials down to the locality level. British colonialism boosted 
chieftaincy through indirect rule in Nigeria. Local chiefs were de facto salaried 
employees of the British administration. They were paid a fixed income out of the tax 
revenues they collected for the British. On the other hand, in Botswana, until 1934 the 
British hardly attempted to establish the direct authority of the Tswana chiefs (Acemoglu 
et al. 2001).  
Ethnic Diversity 
Botswana and Nigeria are very different in their ethnic diversity. Nigeria was created by 
the British through combining numerous existing entities and ethnicities -- more than 250 
-- into a single colony and then nation (Uduma 2013). It is perhaps the most ethnically 
diverse country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Botswana, on the other hand, has very little ethnic 
diversity; nearly 80 percent of the population is Tswana. When colonial rule ended, 
Botswana was a remarkably ethnically homogenous nation (Knuckles 2006). Upon 
independence a majority considered themselves Tswana and shared the same language 
(Robinson 2009). Moreover, Botswana was not at the start of the colonial era and is not 
now as religiously diverse as Nigeria (Knuckles 2006). Almost three quarters of all 
Botswana are Christians (“Botswana” The World Factbook), while Nigeria is split 
between Muslims, Christians and other traditional religions, with Islam having been well-
established before the colonial era. 
Robinson and Parsons (2006) indicated that before the colonial era customary Tswana 
political institutions acted inclusively and successfully included non-Tswana populations 
into the political structures of the local state. This inclusive nature of indigenous Tswana 
institutions decreased the likelihood that alternative groups would violently challenge the 
legitimacy of the new state. Conversely, in Nigeria, the ethnic and religious diversity and 
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divisions created rivalries and led to a bloody civil war (the Biafra War was actually 
fought over the separatist ambitions of one ethnic group – Igbo - in southeast Nigeria) 
and a series of sectarian conflicts, violent struggles for power (Knuckles 2006), multiple 
military coups (Pierce 2006), and a persistent lack of cohesion in society. On the 
contrary, Botswana did not experience the same types of problems. In fact, the same 
political party has ruled Botswana since its independence in 1966. Robinson (2009, p. 9) 
argues that the sense of belonging to a homogeneous group had a politically stabilizing 
effect in Botswana. 
Natural resources Management  
Lange (2004) has pointed out that the nature of Botswana’s and Nigeria’s natural 
resources are very much similar. Both, diamonds and oil reserves require large 
infrastructure, technology and investment in order to be profitably exploited. The 
differences in the regulation of these major extractive industries in Botswana and Nigeria 
set them at the opposite ends of the corruption scale (Knuckles 2006).  
Botswana’s management of its mineral wealth is one good example out of many sound 
economic policies. Its economic exploitation of diamonds and other mineral resources 
has not ended in a resource curse as with many other resource-rich. Botswana has applied 
some useful policies to prevent its resource boom from turning into a disaster. Harvey 
and Lewis (1990) mentioned the governmental heavy investment in education and health 
care as one of the wise strategies Botswana’s government employed. Revenues from the 
diamond industry were heavily reinvested in health care, and in primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education. Moreover, strong foreign exchange reserves have been built and used 
to absorb demand shocks and stabilize real exchange rates (Leith 2000). Macroeconomic 
stability has been ensured by a soundly operating central bank, which was established in 
1976 (Leith 2000). The use of a National Development Plans has determined domestic 
spending. Planned investment has ensured legislative control over public expenditure 
(Martin, 2008). Moreover, policies aiming to diversify the economy (i.e. cattle to 
minerals and finally to manufacturing) have curbed the mineral sector’s share at a level of 
around 40% of the GDP (UNDP 2005). 
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Unlike the diamond industry in Botswana, the oil sector in Nigeria is highly infested with 
corrupt public servants. Nigeria suffers from high levels of corruption due to the diverse 
and strong causes of corruption specific to Nigeria (Seidler 2011). The Nigerian 
government has had little success in properly controlling or legally handling the oil 
extraction industry. As a result, money from the oil industry has often found its way into 
the pockets of Nigerian leaders looking to make a profit off an industry that Nigeria relies 
on to a great extent. In Botswana, on the other side, even though the government owns a 
substantial portion of the diamond extraction industry, profits from this sector rarely go to 
the personal safes of government officials.  
According to Lange (2004), by the time the diamond deposits were discovered in 1967 
Botswana had established state institutions efficient enough to avoid a resource curse. On 
the contrary, Nigeria lacked well-functioning central state institutions upon independence 
and failed to establish them in the crucial first years, which would have helped in 
exploiting its wealth in oil resources (Lange 2009). Similarly, after contrasting the 
economic outcomes of dependence on extractive wealth between Botswana and Nigeria, 
Fosu (2011) found that resource curse exists in Nigeria opposite to Botswana due to the 
differences between their institutional qualities. 
Role of Leadership and Culture  
Knuckles (2006) attributes the sound legislation and control of the diamond industry in 
Botswana to both leadership and culture of intolerance which continued to be less prone 
to corruption than the leadership of Nigeria. Indeed, Knuckles stresses that quality of 
leadership is probably a key reason behind the disparities between Botswana and Nigeria 
in their levels of corruption. However, it is truly difficult to envisage that Botswana has 
simply gotten lucky for almost 40 straight years in having political leadership that is not 
corrupt. Corruption was not tolerated in 1966 and continues not to be tolerated today. 
This culture of intolerance discourage a corrupt leader from seeking power and quickly 
eliminates a leader that becomes corrupt (ibid.).  
In contrast, long history of government corruption has created a lack of faith in the 
government as well as a loss of hope for change in Nigerian society. These two 
characteristics worked together to create a culture that accepts corruption as the only to 
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get things done. This acceptance of corruption prevents from promoting accountability of 
public officials and creates an acceptance of corruption as a means by which one must 
conduct private business. This is not the situation with Botswana, where instances of 
corruption are exceptionally limited and rare when contrasted with those of Nigeria. The 
relatively mild and infrequent nature of corruption in Botswana can partially be attributed 
to a culture that has zero tolerance for corruption and to citizens who highly trust the 
impartiality of their representatives and leaders (ibid.). 
Reasons behind Botswana’s success story 
Robinson and Parsons (2006) argue that the key reason behind the astonishing economic 
performance of Botswana has been strong governance. Seidler (2011) argues that 
Botswana wound up with better institutions than the vast majority of its African peers for 
three reasons. The first reason is based on pre-colonial local institutions. Pre-colonial 
Tswana enjoyed a number of traditional structures that were more conducive for creating 
a modern state. Most importantly, the chiefs’ powers were restricted and the political elite 
pursued inclusive economic strategies. The second reason is embedded in the country’s 
colonial history. For various reasons, British colonial rule was “light”. British 
administration did not significantly alter the pre-existing Tswana arrangements. The last 
reason is a product of the first two factors. In few years immediately before and just after 
independence Tswana institutions underwent a remarkable institutional transformation 
during which local institutions successfully incorporated with modern institutions, many 
of which designed on European standards. 
According to Samatar (1999) two related factors have made Botswana’s success possible: 
wise and disciplined political leadership and a professionally independent and 
accountable public service. Samatar attributes the achievement of Botswana's post-
independence development to what he depicts as an economic and political union of the 
ruling class guided by a disciplined political leadership that is conscious of the 
institutional requirements of its project. The combination of such a political and 
bureaucratic structure made the wise use of Botswana's mineral resources possible (Ibid.). 
Similarly, Martin (2008) mentioned some factors that contributed to the reinforcement of 
good governance and political stability of Botswana. Among these factors are: the 
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transfer of the power of land allocation from the chiefs to the state; the separation of 
government officials from politics; the integration of traditional courts into the official 
court system; and the continuous introduction of expatriate employees in the public 
sector. A Batswana researcher adds that “well established property rights, “rule-based 
governance” and “autonomous Judiciary” are behind the continuous flow of foreign 
direct investment since the1970s (Maipose 2003). Furthermore, Batswana elites have 
been working in an institutional environment that guarantees they would maintain their 
political power if they pursued good policies. They were themselves the main 
beneficiaries of the country’s development. Furthermore, Maipose (2003) emphasized 
that the institutional setting of a multiparty democratic system imposed limitations on the 
illegal use of diamond revenues, rent-seeking or abusive clientelism. This is consistent 
with the arguments of Mehlum et al. (2006) and Robinson et al. (2006) on the crucial role 
institutions play with respect to avoiding the causes of resource curse. 
To sum up, Botswana’s good governance system could be attributed to a unique 
combination of both endogenous and exogenous factors. The earlier incorporate: Tswana 
leadership who pursued broad societal economic interests and promoted good 
governance; the gradual introduction of European institutions which have been adjusted 
to Tswana culture; the integration of important local institutions into the post-colonial 
institutional frameworks (e.g. judiciary system incorporates customary courts); and 
finally, the availability of skilled bureaucrats enabled continuity. On the other side, 
exogenous variables include: pre-existing political institutions constrained political power 
of the chiefs (kgotla); light colonial rule left Tswana pre-colonial institutions untouched; 
high ethnical and religious homogeneity among the Tswana population; rich deposits of 
minerals and diamonds found after independence; and lastly, relative high level of 
geopolitical neglect by the European colonial powers. 
Roots of Nigeria’s socio-economic and political problems 
Pre-colonial Conditions 
The quality of institutions in postcolonial Nigeria did not only stem from the institutions 
established by the colonizers but also the pre-colonial factors (Gennaioli & Rainer 2005). 
Thanks to their continuity, pre-colonial institutions in Nigeria contributed to the nature of 
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contemporary state governance. Abubakar (1980) and Falola (1999) highlighted the poor 
performance of traditional institutions among the Ibo and Ibibio in Nigeria. In addition, 
Nigeria has a long history of government corruption that goes even back to the pre-
colonial period. Lord Lugard (1922) mentioned in his testimony that the British 
administrators themselves complained about corrupt Nigerian officials from the outset of 
the colonial era (Pierce 2006). Interestingly, during the colonial period, Nigerian tax 
officers who were in charge of evaluating farms reportedly used to ask for bribes. If the 
grower declined to pay the bribe, the officer would increase the farm’s reported size and 
thereby forcing the farmer to pay much larger taxes (Ibid.). Moreover, during the era of 
military rule, the government gained a reputation of immunity from accountability and 
punishment (Knuckles, 2006). Because of this long history of government corruption and 
impunity, Nigerian society almost expects public servants to be corrupt, and it seems that 
for many, corruption is an inevitable, and the normal way of doing business (Ibid.). 
Ramifications of Indirect Rule  
The indirect rule approach involved identifying the local power structure: the kings, 
chiefs, or tribesmen. After being identified, the British would then invite, force, or bribe 
them to be part of the their colonial government while granting them significant authority 
over their people. In areas where “tribes” and “tribal” chiefs did not exist, the British 
created them (Pearson n.d.). Lange (2004) argues that the level of indirect rule is strongly 
and negatively related to postcolonial state governance in terms of democratization and 
political stability, bureaucratic effectiveness, rule of law, and governmental integrity. He 
emphasizes that indirect rule produced dispersed forms of control in the form of powerful 
local intermediaries that impede authority of state institutions. According to Lange, the 
extent of indirect rule in Nigeria was 93.4 percent, whereas Botswana level of indirect 
rule was only 42.5 percent. This data confirms the conclusion of Mamdani (1996) that 
indirect colonial rule hinders postcolonial political development.  
In his book, Citizen and Subject, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) argues that former colonial 
states have maintained the framework of indirect rule, in which chiefs have been able to 
translate their colonial powerful positions into a local despotism. Moreover, Mamdani 
asserts that chiefs’ corrupt practices were tolerated and fostered by colonial and post-
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colonial administrations similarly. Additionally, Mamdani finds that indirect rule 
generated a ‘‘bifurcated state’’ in which two distinct and unharmonious systems of 
governance existed - one dominated by the colonial government and the other by local 
chiefs. Likewise, Lange (2004) suggested two aspects of indirect rule that boosted local 
autocracy at the expense of centralized control. First, the central government was very 
small. Subsequently, the indirectly ruled colony emerged without the power necessary to 
execute policies in the regions outside the capital and wound up having no alternatives 
other than using force. Second, indirect rule granted chiefs great authority and because it 
lacked formalization, chiefs were able to mold and use it for personal benefit such as the 
control over communal lands (Mamdani, 1996). Lange (2004) argues that the institutional 
heritage of indirect rule was that it left behind an ineffective central government and 
powerful local chiefs, and thereby created a system of “decentralized despotism” that has 
left the state ineffective. Thus, when independence era reforms failed to weaken chiefs, 
this system of ‘‘decentralized despotism’’ created a significant limitation to governance 
and statewide development (Mamdani, 1996).  
Lastly, one substantial outcome of indirect rule was the accentuation and deepening of 
ethnic identities and suppression of the development of a national cohesiveness. Playing 
the ethnic card served British colonial interests very well by forcing people to focus on 
their differences rather than confronting their unique enemy (Pearson n.d.). Similarly, 
Lange (2004), Mahoney, and Hau (2006) found that indirect British rule triggered 
ethnical conflicts due to the creation of politicized ethnic groups and patron-client 
networks. 
Ethnic heterogeneity and Political Instability 
Large body of research has argued that ethnic conflicts in Africa were to a large degree 
product of the colonial era (Englebert 2000). European colonizers established colonies 
that combined many different ethnicities, religions and languages (The Saylor Foundation 
n.d.). Because drawing of borders in Sub-Saharan Africa was done without involving 
local structures, the colonizers combined different ethnic groups in one nation 
(Alemazung, 2010). This has led to many countries being too ethnically diverse, and in 
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the worst cases has pooled ethnic groups that cannot co-exist, Nigeria as an example 
(Knuckles, 2006).  
Consecutive colonial constitutions in Nigeria entrenched political power on regional basis 
(Ogunbadejo, 1979). Likewise, Amadi (2007) asserts that colonial laws generated ethnic 
polarization by regionalizing and ethnicizing access of Nigerians to privileges and rights. 
Thus, parties were organized on ethnic bases. As a result, ethnic divisions led to the 
marginalization of parties that declined to merge with the ruling party. Subsequently, 
these ethnic divisions contributed to violence and political instability (Alemazung, 2010), 
and prevalent social inequalities (Lange, Mahoney & Hau 2006). 
Lange, Mahoney and Hau (2006) found that colonies with low levels of colonialism were 
also afflicted by ethno-racial strife. They implied that ethnicity-based stratification 
systems established by the British led to a sustainment of ethnical divisions. In particular, 
these systems stopped large groups from participating in productive economic 
opportunities, stifled the formation of labor associations, and often fuelled violent ethnic 
conflicts. Moreover, they argued that strong ethnic identities may prevent the spread of 
trust in a society. This in turn undermines social capital, legitimacy of the political 
leadership and its stability (Lange, Mahoney & Hau, 2006). 
Ethnicity can be one of the explanations for authoritarian rule in multi-ethnic states such 
as Nigeria (Healey & Robinson 1994). In Nigeria, political instability arose from ethnic 
conflict exacerbated by a flawed federal structure, which provided the pretext for military 
intervention. As Decalo (1985) noted, the single party became the preferred option for 
governing divided societies. In contrast, in societies characterized by dispersed ethnic 
groups in which there are many ethnic groups, and where no single group predominates 
(as in Tanzania, and to a lesser extent, Ghana) political co-operation tends to be the 
outcome rather than conflict and instability. 
Some may use the argument of Sawyer (2003), that ongoing conflicts between African 
populations are repeatedly labeled as ethnic conflicts despite the fact that most of them 
are exacerbated by the failure of governance mechanisms relevant to conflict resolution. 
However, this can be countered by the fact that colonial powers stimulated the internal 
‘tribal’ hatreds and created societies that were often ethnically divided. At the point of 
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independence, fears of state dissolutions along ethnic lines were prevalent, with the 
Biafra civil war as an example. While such diversity does not necessarily hinder state 
governance, the deep societal divisions created by colonial policies created significant 
challenges to African governments and made the goal of state consolidation even more 
difficult (The Saylor Foundation n.d.). 
Others may argue that ethnic conflicts were there before the colonial era. However, 
Rodney (1973) noted that “nowhere in the history of pre-colonial Nigeria” can anybody 
recall the slaughter of the Igbos at the hands of the Hausas or any occurrence which 
proposes that people were battling one another due to ethnic background. Rodney went to 
on to argue that indeed there were conflicts, however, they were for different motives 
such as trade competition, religious conflicts, and the struggle for political predominance. 
Rodney argued that “tribalism” was itself a result of the way colonizers undertook to pool 
people together in order to exploit them. It was a product of “regional separations” and 
“differential access” by specific ethnicities and tribes into the colonial structure and 
economy. 
Ethnic heterogeneity: Governance and Corruption 
Low levels of British colonial administration (i.e. indirect rule) divided the society 
through the creation of politicized ethnic identities and patron-client networks (Lange, 
Mahoney & Hau, 2006). Throughout sub-Saharan Africa the colonial administration 
channeled resources to the chiefs, who in turn passed them on to their key advocates in 
order to maintain their positions. These patron-client relations produced politicized ethnic 
identities because common ethnic background was the key source of chiefdom legitimacy 
and because the provision of common goods to locals, especially land, tied one’s ethnic 
identity to material rewards (Mamdani 1996). Moreover, given scarce resources and 
competition over the post-independence state, the chiefs and other politicians often 
resorted to ethnic mobilization for political support, thereby embedding the state in a 
vicious cycle of polarization. Thus, Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that ethnic diversity 
has led to social polarization and entrenched interest groups in Africa and has thereby 
increased the likelihood of selecting socially sub-optimal policies, where the 
representatives of each ethnic group favors the adoption of policies which serve their 
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group at the expense of the state as a whole, because the benefits to their group are 
greater than their share of the national cost of their policies (Englebert, 2000). 
As per Lange, Mahoney & Hau, (2006), if ethnic divisions were strong within a 
government, they would pave the way for corruption. Ethnic diversity, tribalism, and 
permanent tensions between ethnic groups all lead to a lack of cohesion, not only in the 
government, but also in society as a whole. Ekeanyanwo, Loremikan & Ikubaje (2004) 
affirm that the absence of cohesion among people paves the way for corruption, and 
escalates it if it already exists. Moreover, the lack of cohesion might suppress any 
initiative for fighting corruption. Accordingly, Knuckles (2006) asserts that strong ethnic 
divisions within societies are the most significant factor that affects country’s level of 
corruption. Likewise, if electorates vote based on their ethnic loyalties, there will be a 
stronger motivation to act corruptly in order for one political party to maintain power. 
Also, there will be more allowance of corruption if it does occur, since a group in power 
might often be seen as infallible by the ethnicity that put them in power and might be 
more unwilling to advocate anti-corruption laws (Omotunde 2004). 
Conclusion 
This study attempts to explore whether or not colonial rule contributed to a range of 
disparities in the competency of institutions and state governance, using Botswana and 
Nigeria as case studies for two post-colonial states.  
Much evidence confirms that good governance and strong state institutions are the key 
explanations for Botswana’s success story. This good governance stems from many 
factors, principal among them are: First, democratic and inclusive Pre-colonial Tswana 
institutions; Second, light colonial rule that left the local frameworks relatively 
untouched; Third, the homogeneity of population had contributed to the political stability 
of the country; Fourth and most importantly, disciplined political leadership which 
employed well-educated autonomous bureaucrats and gradually introduced modern 
independent state institutions; and finally a prevalent culture that is corruption intolerant. 
On the other hand, many factors have contributed to a lagging economic performance and 
political instability in Nigeria. These factors include: First, the British colonialism which 
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created the colony then the nation of Nigeria out of too many incompatible pre-existing 
entities and ethnicities. This led to the creation of a highly ethnically divided society, 
which I describe as too ethnic to survive; Second, a long history of governmental 
corruption that can be traced back to a time even before the colonial period; Third, 
unequal British indirect rule that employed very different forms of governance in the 
south and the north of Nigeria; Fourth, the poor leadership and weak state institutions that 
achieve nothing beyond keeping the state from dissolution; Fifth, the existence of 
stronger local and traditional institutions that has led to the loss of government 
legitimacy; and finally, the perception of government as immune and always corrupt, 
which has fostered a culture that is highly tolerant for corruption. 
Based on the above findings, we can conclude that colonialism has contributed to the 
Nigeria’s political instability through escalating ethnic strife given the historic fact that 
Britain has created the country as a nation that is too ethnic to survive. From this 
perspective, we may argue that colonialism has indirectly contributed to the enduring 
corruption of the Nigerian governments in two ways. (1) Based on the findings of Joseph 
(1987) who thinks corruption is intertwined with ethnic politics; and (2) the British 
indirect rule, which granted local chiefs extraordinary powers and created a complex 
network of patron-client relationships. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that 
colonialism is not the only determinant of the current levels of corruption in Nigeria. 
Pierce (2006) asserts that researchers think of corruption as a basic component of the 
Nigerian society, given the evidence that the British administrators themselves 
complained about corrupt Nigerian public servants since the onset of colonialism (Smith 
1964). 
However, this does not excuse Nigerian leadership from responsibility of the current 
governance failure. As Sawyer (2004) emphasized, governance failure in Africa has its 
roots in several sources, principal among them being the colonial legacy and the post-
independence state leaders. Nigerian leaders have constantly failed to counter the impacts 
of colonialism and pursue a development strategy that is inclusive of its diverse 
populations. Unlike Nigerian leadership, Botswana, on the other hand, has since 
independence experienced a stable democratic process and strong leadership structure. 
Much evidence supports the idea that the key reason behind Botswana’s success is its 
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leaderships. Botswana leaders were able to correct the inherent negatives of the indirect 
rule. Botswana’s success can also be credited to its democratic culture and the wise 
management of revenues from the diamond industry. Finally, the governmental heavy 
investment in human capital, both education and health care, was cited as one of 
Botswana’s major roots of success. 
The above points of leverage found in this study support the third hypothesis that states 
that quality and strength of contemporary institutions in the former colonial states is a 
function of both colonial experiences and domestic conditions and arrangements before 
and after the arrival of colonizers.  
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Appendix I 
Figure (1) Worldwide Governance Indicators - Botswana 
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Figure (2) Worldwide Governance Indicators – Nigeria 
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